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Abstract: This paper makes an attempt to explore whether intelligence of nations is related to 
gender inequality, measured by Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), in developing countries. 
Related literature robustly links intelligence to economic development, poverty, quality of 
institutions and informal economic activity. Controlling for conventional antecedents of gender 
inequality (i.e. religion, political regime, legal origins and trade openness), this paper finds that, on 
average, a 10-point increase in national IQ scores in the developing world is associated with an 8.2 
point reduction in SIGI, ceteris paribus. To test the robustness of our findings we apply instrumental 
variables (IV) and robust regression methods. We also test whether our results are sensitive to the 
choice of control variables and heterogeneity of nations in our sample. The negative association of 
intelligence with gender inequality remains statistically significant and intact in all cases.  
Keywords: intelligence; IQ; gender equality; cross-country; SIGI; developing countries 
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1. Introduction 
 
Promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment is at the core of the international 
development agenda. Naturally, gender inequality has important implications for society as it has 
been shown to hinder overall development and increase deprivation (World Bank, 2001). In 
particular, it has been connected to economic growth (Esteve-Volart, 2000), investment in 
infrastructure (Chattopadhya & Duflo, 2001) and corruption (Dollar et al., 2001). Therefore, 
identifying the driving forces of gender equity has been an important subject of research in social 
sciences, especially over the last decade.  
While a growing literature reports that religion, institutions and democracy ‘make a 
significant impact on gender inequity’ (Rao & Kelleher, 2003 p. 142), we investigate a variable that 
has not received the recognition we think it deserves in the analysis of international differences in 
gender inequality, namely intelligence.  
The significance of intelligence (cognitive skills) has become broadly acknowledged in 
empirical literature over the last decade (Lynn & Vanhanen, 2012a). For example, intelligence has a 
significant association with long-run economic growth (Ram, 2007), earnings and income inequality 
(Kanazawa, 2009). Yet, it is conceivable that intelligence leads to other benefits to the public which 
are not captured by monetary indicators such as GDP per capita and wages. One possible noteworthy 
illustration of the positive externalities of intelligence may be an enhanced role of women in society.  
To what extent does intelligence contribute to gender equality? In this study we hypothesize 
that the benefit of intelligence builds up either through the quality of institutions, or through civic 
participation among citizens. Indeed, related literature demonstrates that intelligence is an important 
determinant of institutional arrangements (Kanyama, 2014; Salahodjaev, 2015a). For example, in 
early empirical articles intelligence, measured by the Army General Classification Test, is positively 
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linked with the rule of law at the US state level (Davenport & Remmers, 1950). More recently, 
Potrafke (2012), using data from 125 countries, documents that intelligence, measured by national 
IQs, has a negative relationship with the corruption perceptions index. In this vein, cognitive abilities 
are positively correlated with approval for progressive reforms and negatively correlated with radical 
positions (Inglehart, 1997). 
Further, particular causal explanations connecting the quality of institutions to gender 
equality are a cognitive effect and an ethical effect, which are in turn determined by the intelligence 
of nations that ‘can process complex information and actively participate in politics’ (Simpson, 1997 
p. 157). Certainly, if traditional patriarchal societies ignored the role of women in the community, 
then intelligence is a potential determinant of modern values as it nurtures ‘a habit of critical 
thinking, questioning religious dogmas and other sources of traditional authority’ (Meisenberg, 2004 
p. 139). While Solon (2014) highlights that intelligent individuals are more likely to provide greater 
freedom to less represented groups of society, there is also evidence that intelligence leads to 
liberalism, prosociality (Solon, 2014) and generosity (Millet & Dewitte, 2007). Therefore, a positive 
link between intelligence and pro-gender institutions is predictable as intelligence ‘broadens man’s 
outlook, enables him to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains him from adhering to 
extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to make rational electoral choices’ (Lipset, 1960 p. 
54). 
Moreover, gender inequality is also negatively associated with political participation, an 
aspect of human behavior that is captured by intelligence (e.g. Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011). For 
example, in a study of 12,000 respondents from the High School and Beyond Survey, Dee (2004) 
documents that educational attainment is an important antecedent of an efficiently functioning 
democracy. In particular, when schooling increases by one year, political participation increases by 
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6.8%. Dee (2004) also shows that education has a positive impact on other measures of civic 
behavior. 
Milligan et al. (2004) finds that education has a positive association with political 
participation. Their results show that educated individuals are more likely to vote, follow political 
news and possess more information on candidates and campaigns since they recognize the public 
needs which will influence their vote. In a study of participants in the 1970 British Cohort Study, 
Deary et al. (2008) detect a positive relationship between childhood intelligence and the probability 
of voting in elections. Further, the study reports that individuals with higher scores in the British 
Ability Scales test are more likely to attend demonstrations and sign petitions. In this line, similar 
studies find that assessment tests scores are negatively correlated with conservatism – another 
determinant of gender inequality (Cohen, 2004) on an individual and country level (Stankov, 2009). 
Thus, we anticipate that intelligence has a negative association with gender inequality as ‘democratic 
societies usually have more women in parliament than under democratic societies’ (Inglehart et al., 
2002 p. 232).  
The hypothesized intelligence-gender equality nexus is tested on a sample of 107 nations. 
The measure of inequality is the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) for 2014. The results 
indicate that a 10-point increase in national IQ scores is associated with an 8.2 point reduction in 
gender inequality (SIGI).  
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents data and methodology, Section 3 
discusses the main results and Section 4 concludes the paper. 
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2. Data and methods 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Whereas many gender-related indices such as the Gender Equity Index (Social Watch Report, 
2005), Gender Inequality Index (GII Report, UNDP, 2010), Global Gender Gap Index (Lopez-Claros 
& Zahidi, 2005) and others are generally considered to be outcome-based indicators that disclose the 
after-effects of already-established institutional environments (gender-related gaps in education, 
health, employment, and political participation), the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) 
mainly targets the origins of gender inequalities and reflects the state of affairs in both formal and 
informal institutions (societal norms, values, traditions, customs, cultural peculiarities etc.) that shape 
and bring about gender-related inequality issues in different countries (Neumayer & De Soysa, 2007; 
Branisa et al., 2014). As Klasen & Schüler (2011 p. 8) put it ‘the innovation of SIGI is that it shows 
how social institutions affect gender inequality; thus, it focuses not on gender outcomes, but on 
institutions that affect such outcomes’. In this sense the SIGI captures those aspects of gender 
inequality that go beyond related rights and liberties, and rest upon institutional causes of the issue. 
The SIGI consists of such sub-indices as Family code, Civil liberties, Physical integrity, Son 
preference, and Ownership rights which are calculated based on different social indicators taken from 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Gender, Institutions and 
Development Database. It ‘combines them into a multidimensional index of women’s deprivation 
caused by gendered social institutions … and empirical results confirm that the SIGI complements 
other gender-related indices’ (Branisa et al., 2014 p. 29).  
This index has been used in different contexts. For instance, Branisa et al. (2013) empirically 
proves that contemporary issues surrounding gendered development outcomes need to consider 
inequalities in social institutions as a separate constraint. They demonstrate how institutions fostering 
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gender equality are associated with female education, child mortality, fertility, and corruption. On the 
other hand, there is evidence that these institutions are also associated with women’s labor market 
participation (e.g. Jüttig et al., 2010). Yet, some other studies using SIGI show that the economic and 
social aspects of globalization strengthen institutions fostering gender equality (e.g. Potrafke & 
Ursprung, 2012).  
 
Independent variable 
 
Intelligence is the main variable of interest in this study. As a proxy for intelligence we rely 
on national IQ data from Lynn & Vanhanen (2012b). This dataset, a revised edition of Lynn & 
Vanhanen (2002), contains national IQs for the majority of nations and has been widely used in 
empirical studies (see e.g. Voracek, 2004; Salahodjaev, 2015a; Salahodjaev, 2015b; Burhan et al., 
2015). It represents a compilation of numerous average national IQ tests observed over the past 100 
years or longer. For those geopolitical regions with missing administered intelligence tests 
‘estimated IQs were obtained from the measured IQs of neighboring countries with culturally and 
racially similar populations’ (Lynn & Meisenberg, 2010 p. 354). Overall, after discarding possible 
missing observations for other control variables IQ scores range from 60.1 in Malawi to 105.8 in 
China.  
 
Control variables 
 
In order to address potential omitted variable bias, we use a set of control variables. First, we 
control for the percentage share of Muslims among the population. Related studies find that cross-
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country differences in gender inequality are substantially explained by the established heritage, 
beliefs and norms related to marriage, proprietorship and paternity (e.g. Morrisson & Jütting, 2005). 
In addition to religion, political studies suggest that democratic regime and political orientation 
of the ruling government are also linked to enforcement of gender equality laws. We use democracy 
index, measured as average of political rights and civil liberties, in our empirical model because it is 
widely conjectured that democratic societies pay greater attention to gender balance compared to 
authoritarian regimes (Norris & Inglehart, 2001; Beer, 2009). Neumayer & De Soysa (2007 p. 1521) 
argue that “[s]ince women represent a slight majority in most country’s electorate, one would expect 
that in fully democratic countries women enjoy no worse economic rights than men”. Similarly, 
related studies establish that left-leaning parties put greater value on gender equality (Dahlerup, 
2005). For example, gender movements in Eastern Europe were successful to initiate legislative and 
institutional reforms under the rule of leftist parties (Avdeeva, 2009). As a measure of political 
orientation we use a dichotomous variable for left-leaning governments. 
We add dummy variables for Napoleonic civil law and Communist common law from La 
Porta et al. (1999). Indeed, since the seminal works of Acemoglu et al. (2001) and La Porta et al. 
(2009) ample cross-country studies document the impact of legal origins on institutions, corruption, 
financial development and gender inequality (Albouy, 2012; La Porta et al., 2008; Jayachandran, 
2015; Salahodjaev, 2015c). For instance Potrafke & Ursprung (2012) find that gender institutions are 
stronger in nations with communist common laws as compared to nations with English common law.  
Finally, we include a trade openness variable and a dummy for high income countries to proxy 
economic opportunities. Trade openness is calculated as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports 
to GDP. The inclusion of this measure is supported by an expectation that the more open a country is, 
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the more the country will embrace the pros and cons of globalization, and thus social institutions will 
develop leading to more gender equality (e.g. Neumayer & de Soysa, 2007).  
We shall mention that a dummy for high income nations enables us to calculate for the 
difference in gender (in)equality between high income and low income nations not accounted by our 
main variables.  
The relevant statistics are taken from World Bank’s World Development Indicators database 
and averaged out for a period of 2010-2012. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 and 
the correlation matrix for main variables is supplied in Table A1. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description Source Mean (Std. dev.) 
SIGI Social Institutions and Gender Index OECD 19.098 (14. 356) 
IQ National IQ score Lynn & Vanhanen 
(2012b) 
84.102 (10.847) 
Muslim Share of population belonging to 
Muslim group 
CIA Factbook 25.062 (36.932) 
Left-wing =1 if government is left-leaning World Bank 0.318 (36.932) 
Democracy Mean of political rights and civil 
freedoms 
Freedom House 4.675 (1.977) 
Legal (f) French legal origins La Porta et al. (1999) 0.433 (0.497) 
Legal (s) Socialist legal origins La Porta et al. (1999) 0.174 (0.380) 
HIGHINCOME =1 if high income country World Bank 0.350 (0.478) 
Trade (logged) Bilateral trade as a % of GDP World Bank 4.446 (0.470) 
 
Methods 
 
In order to estimate the impact of IQ on gender inequality, we estimate the following linear 
model: 
iixioi eCVIQSIGI   1       (1) 
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where the dependent variable is SIGI, a new measure of social institutions related to gender 
inequality. IQ is an average national intelligence, and CV is a set of control variables. Analyses were 
performed using STATA, version 11.2. 
 
3. Results 
 
Main results 
 
Table 2 presents the main regression results. In model 1, we start with a simple bivariate 
regression without controlling for potential antecedents of gender (in)equality. We find that the 
coefficient for intelligence is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The restricted 
specification estimates provide general support for the model with an adjusted R2 of 0.326. 
Particularly, a 10-point increase in IQ score is associated with an 8.2 point reduction in SIGI.  
However, this negative link may be caused by the effect of excluded antecedents of gender 
inequality that are spuriously correlated with intelligence. Models 2 to 5 are stepwise regressions 
where we include other control variables in sequence. We add the share of Muslims and left-wing 
parties in model 2. The signs of control variables are in line with related studies. The orientation of 
the government is not significant, however. The association of intelligence with the response variable 
preserves its statistical significance. 
In model 3, introducing the democracy index from Freedom House, a measure that captures 
the quality of democratic institutions, does not change the findings much. The positive relation of 
democracy to gender equity corresponds to the findings of Brown (2004). Adding legal origins 
(model 4) improves the share of total variance in gender inequality explained by the model (adj. 
R2=0.594). The coefficient for intelligence retains its significance: p<.05. 
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Finally, in model 6 we introduce proxies for economic opportunities. In line with Potrafke & 
Ursprung (2012), we document that women enjoy greater equality in more open and democratic 
countries and less equality in countries with British legal origins (reference group). 
 
Table 2 
Main results: OLS regression 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
IQ -0.819*** -0.661*** -0.592*** -0.418*** -0.421*** -0.429*** -0.307*** 
 (0.099) (0.091) (0.090) (0.118) (0.126) (0.124)  
Muslim   0.167*** 0.145*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.402*** 
  (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)  
Left-wing   -3.090 -2.844 -3.155* -3.130* -3.115* -0.103* 
  (1.970) (1.863) (1.763) (1.784) (1.786)  
Democracy    -1.812*** -2.178*** -2.197*** -2.039*** -0.242*** 
   (0.607) (0.629) (0.682) (0.695)  
Legal (f)     -5.647** -5.644** -5.716** -0.202*** 
    (2.446) (2.457) (2.475)  
Legal (s)    -8.389** -8.374** -8.081** -0.246*** 
    (3.478) (3.501) (3.444)  
HI      0.302 0.719 0.014 
     (2.830) (2.879)  
Trade (log)      -2.009** -0.097** 
      (0.765)  
Constant 85.110*** 68.473*** 56.228*** 45.648*** 45.796*** 55.584*** - 
 (8.428) (7.839) (8.890) (10.334) (10.581) (10.658)  
N 107 106 106 106 106 105 105 
adj. R2 0.326 0.534 0.570 0.594 0.590 0.613 0.613 
Notes: Standardized betas are reported in model 7. Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors 
in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level is denoted by ***; ** denotes significance at the 5% 
level; and * significance at the 10% level. 
 
However, the results in Table 3 may be substantially biased by the traditional limitation of 
the mean regression approach, namely homogeneity of parameters (e.g. Durlauf & Johnson, 1995). 
The conventional mean regression assumptions ignore the dissimilarity of nations, and imply that 
intelligence has the same association with gender inequality across the sample. To address this 
concern we re-estimate our main model using quantile regression approach with heteroskedasticity-
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adjusted standard errors (e.g. Koenker, 2005; Hao & Naiman, 2007). While it has been frequently 
used in empirical economics (e.g. Canarella & Pollard, 2004), many articles that contribute to the 
understanding of intelligence are uninformed of it ‘as it was developed relatively recently and is 
rarely taught in statistical courses at many universities’ (Cade & Noon, 2003 p. 412). The reported 
results in Table 3 indicate that the negative impact of intelligence is greater in countries with a 
higher level of inequality. 
In particular, the coefficients in Table 3 range from 0.334 to 0.459 and they are all statistically 
significant.1 These results further indicate that intelligence exerts a quantitatively weighty 
contribution to explain gender inequality, which must not be ignored considering the role of 
intelligence in fostering social capital and institutional arrangements pinpointed in ample studies.  
 
Table 3 
Main results: quantile regressions 
 
 (1) 
Q 0.2 
(2) 
Q 0.4 
(3) 
Q 0.5 
(4) 
Q 0.6 
(5) 
Q 0.8 
IQ -0.334* -0.406*** -0.459*** -0.375*** -0.436* 
 (0.172) (0.123) (0.118) (0.129) (0.223) 
Muslim  0.113*** 0.158*** 0.163*** 0.186*** 0.126** 
 (0.040) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.049) 
Democracy  -1.786* -2.131*** -2.124*** -2.250*** -4.038*** 
 (0.958) (0.641) (0.592) (0.682) (1.319) 
N 105 105 105 105 105 
Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level is 
denoted by ***; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and * significance at the 10% level. Other 
control variables include logged trade, HIGHINCOME, legal origins and left-wing. 
 
On the other hand one may argue that cross-national studies have a critical drawback that 
limits their value for policy suggestions – the direction of causality. In particular, nations with 
stronger gender institutions may invest more in the human capital of female individuals and thus have 
                                                          
1 The exact levels of significance of the IQ coefficients at the first and last quantiles are equal to 0.0551 and 0.0535 
respectively. This indicates that the probability of committing a Type I error in each case is insignificantly higher than 
conventionally used level of 0.05.  
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higher national IQ (reverse causality). Therefore, controlling for the feedback effect that runs from 
gender equality to intelligence is crucial in our empirical exercise which otherwise may give rise to a 
so-called simultaneous equation bias. Furthermore, it may be a case that IQ and SIGI are correlated 
with another unobserved variable that is not included into our regression. This may lead to an omitted 
variable bias. These problems are special cases of an endogeneity problem in econometrics. The main 
trouble with the use of OLS method in regressions that contain one or more endogenous variables is 
that the OLS estimators in such cases are biased as well as inconsistent (see e.g. Engle et al., 1983; 
Gujarati, 2011).  
A conventional way to address an endogeneity problem in empirical economics is to apply the 
instrumental variables (IV) method (see e.g. Stock & Watson, 2012). Since an endogenous regressor 
in our model is intelligence, our task is to select such variables that are linked to gender inequality 
only through their association with intelligence. In essence, these ‘proxy’ or ‘substitute’ variables 
(instruments) for intelligence should not be directly related to gender inequality. Although there is no 
universally accepted set of such instruments for intelligence we use historical prevalence of 
infectious diseases index and ultraviolet (UV) exposure of population as the instruments that are 
associated with intelligence in origin. For example, Eppig et al. (2010) used global data and showed 
that cross-national distribution of intelligence is correlated with the historical prevalence of infectious 
diseases. Furthermore, infections in the human body may be linked to cognitive development by 
having effect on genes entangled in the formation of neurons and linkages between them (Deverman 
& Patterson, 2012). Indeed, related literature reports that infectious disease prevalence significantly 
impairs the accumulation of cognitive abilities (Ijaz, & Rubino, 2012) and human capital formation 
(e.g. Schultz, 2003; Chakraborty et al., 2010).  
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 In the same vein, similar studies suggest that ultraviolet exposure has a detrimental 
association with cognitive abilities (Silber et al., 1992; Templer & Arikawa, 20062). For instance, a 
recent article by Leon (2015) documents that UV exposure explains the geographic differences in the 
cognitive abilities in the USA.  
Leaning on these studies, we use data on pathogen prevalence from Murray & Schaller (2010) 
and on ultraviolet exposure from Ashraf & Galor (2010) in our analysis. One should note that these 
two variables may be considered as appropriate instruments for intelligence since they don’t have a 
direct relationship with gender (in)equality.    
Once an instrument selection process is completed, we should proceed with the design of the 
IV method as follows: First, we regress the potentially endogenous variable (IQ) against its 
instrument(s) (Zni) and calculate the predicted values for IQi (IQi^) (1st stage). And then we use those 
fitted values (IQi^) in the main equation as an independent variable (2nd stage). This estimation 
approach is called Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) method. The process has the following 
specification: 
iixnioi vCVZIQ   1        (1
st stage) 
iixioi eCVIQSIGI   ^1       (2
nd stage) 
The estimates for 2SLS and a robust regression approach are reported in Table 4. Model 1 
shows that intelligence is negatively associated with gender inequality even when we control for 
potential ‘dual’ causality between IQ and SIGI. It is important to note that the estimates for IQ are 
now quantitatively larger. A one-point increase in predicted intelligence is associated with a 1.13 
point reduction in rescaled SIGI. The goodness-of-fit measure of the model (adj. R-squared) from the 
first stage regression shows that the variation in instruments explains approximately 59% of the 
                                                          
2 See MacKie (2000); Solomon (2008) for further related evidence. 
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variation in IQ. These instruments capture variations in intelligence reasonably well: they are 
negative and statistically significant at 5% level. For example, in model 2, a one standard deviation 
increase in the UV exposure is associated with 3.8 point reduction in IQ. The strength of the 
instruments is also confirmed by the first stage F-statistics (F=15.95; p=.00).  
Further, the results in cross-national studies are particularly sensitive to specific (influential) 
observations which cannot be adequately accounted in the empirical exercises with the mean (OLS) 
regressions. Indeed, Edgeworth (1887) argues that by minimizing the squared residuals, OLS is very 
easily affected by the presence of such observations (outliers). Moreover, Swartz & Welsch (1986, p. 
171) assert: “OLS and many other commonly used maximum likelihood techniques have an 
unbounded influence function; any small subset of the data [abnormal or outlier-present observations, 
in particular] can have an arbitrarily large influence on their coefficient estimates.” This is why as a 
further test for robustness, in model 3 of Table 4, we replicate the results using a robust regression 
(RREG) technique3 that fits the model assigning lower weights to observations with an extreme 
effect (outliers) on a predictor variable (Li, 1985)4. The results indicate that the value of the IQ 
coefficient is 0.406 and statistically significant at the 1% level. To exemplify, this relationship shows 
that for a change in mean country IQ from 79 (Nicaragua) to 88.6 (Turkey) the rescaled SIGI falls by 
approximately 3.9 points.  
 
Table 4 
Main results: IV & RREG 
 
 
 
Stage 
Dependent variable 
(1) 
IV 
2nd 
SIGI 
(2)  
IV 
1st 
IQ 
(3) 
RREG 
- 
SIGI 
                                                          
3 Robust regression (rreg) is an alternative technique to OLS regression. It is used to control for cases when data is 
characterized as having outliers or influential observations. This technique helps retain those observations in regression 
by moderating their influence on the coefficient estimate. 
4 See Hamilton (1991, 1992) for a more detailed review of rreg. 
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IQ -1.130***  -0.406*** 
 (0.297)  (0.131) 
Muslim  0.153*** -0.027 0.157*** 
 (0.032) (0.021) (0.027) 
Left-wing  -1.215 2.970* -3.194 
 (2.301) (1.565) (2.062) 
Democracy  -1.750** -0.166 -1.913*** 
 (0.771) (0.527) (0.686) 
Legal (f)  -2.226 4.098** -5.395** 
 (3.253) (1.695) (2.417) 
Legal (s) 5.173 6.959** -6.671* 
 (5.807) (2.938) (3.401) 
HIGHINCOME  8.631* 4.751 0.801 
 (4.597) (3.209) (4.194) 
Trade (log) -2.263** -1.559 -2.164 
 (0.930) (1.021) (1.398) 
UV exposure  -0.050**  
  (0.021)  
Pathogen prevalence  -5.506**  
  (2.201)  
Constant 108.530*** 96.558*** 53.554*** 
 (23.512) (7.870) (12.598) 
N 95 95 105 
adj. R2 0.501 0.589 0.551 
First stage F-stat  
(p-value) 
- 15.95  
(0.00) 
- 
Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level is 
denoted by ***; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and * significance at the 10% level. 
 
Robustness tests 
 
We check the robustness of our findings in a number of ways. First, we re-estimate Eq. (1) 
using an alternative vector of control variables: variation of GDP per capita that is not explained by 
intelligence (GDP per capita residual) and dummies for geographical regions. The GDP per capita 
residual represents cross-national differences in GDP per capita that are not explained by 
intelligence (intelligence-irrelevant level of economic development). To obtain this measure we 
regress logged GDP per capita on IQ and save the residuals.  
We also include a KOF index as an alternative measure of openness (Samimi et al., 2012). 
Further, abundance of natural resources may increase social inequality and reduce women’s 
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prospects for employment. Working in a primary sector of extracting natural resources is capital-
intensive and vocationally-discriminative in favor of men. Driven by the expected labor demand and 
earnings, households invest more resources in human capital of sons (over daughters) (e.g. Alderman 
& King, 1998). We therefore include fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise exports for the 
years 2003-2013 from World Development Indicators. 
While mineral resource dependence is positively associated with gender inequality, 
intelligence and IQ-irrelevant level of GDP per capita are negatively linked with gender inequality.   
 
Table 5 
Robustness checks: alternative controls  
 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS Standardized 
betas 
IQ -0.821*** -0.592*** 
 (0.266)  
GDP per person (residual) -4.125** -0.268** 
 (1.803)  
Globalization index (KOF) 0.099 0.090 
 (0.157)  
Fuel exports 0.110** 0.206** 
 (0.045)  
Constant 74.566*** - 
 (19.636)  
N 101 101 
adj. R2 0.597 0.597 
Notes: Standardized betas are reported in column 3. Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level is denoted by ***; ** denotes significance at the 
5% level; and * significance at the 10% level. Regional dummies for developing countries included 
but not reported.  
 
We also test the estimates of IQ to see if they are sensitive to the measure of income. 
Henderson et al. (2012) argues that ‘[r]elative to developed countries, in many developing countries 
a much smaller fraction of economic activity is conducted within the formal sector, the degree of 
economic integration and price equalization across regions is lower, and, most significantly, the 
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government statistical infrastructure is weaker. These factors make the calculation of nominal GDP 
(total value added, in domestic prices) difficult’ (p. 992). To address this issue, we use a statistical 
framework that estimates GDP per capita for developing countries in our sample based on the 
‘visible light, byproduct from human activity, emitted from earth as captured by a series of US Air 
Force weather satellites’ (Salahodjaev, 2015a p. 132). The results reported in Table 6 show that the 
association of intelligence with the outcome variable still remains intact. For example, the reader 
may argue that when thinking about the association between intelligence and gender (in)equality, 
one should also recognize that apart from estimates residuals may also be driven by regional 
differences or differences in GDP per capita. Thus, residuals may be heteroscedastic as we 
incorporate nations from various regions with their own converging clubs by GDP per capita. To 
resolve this issue we use Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression with logged GDP per person 
and regional dummies as the weight function. The estimates in model 4 show that IQ is now 
significant at the 1% level and similar in magnitude to the estimates under OLS regression.  
Table 6 
Robustness checks: intelligence and measures of income 
 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
WLS 
IQ -0.460** -0.469** -1.594** -0.429*** 
 (0.211) (0.203) (0.765) (0.101) 
GDP per capita (log) -1.962 -2.795* -1.128 -1.775** 
 (1.284) (1.591) (2.428) (0.784) 
Constant  66.187*** 75.029*** 147.552*** 83.038*** 
 (19.733) (21.270) (45.316) (9.652) 
N 105 104 94 104 
adj. R2 0.535 0.536 0.401 0.782 
GDP per capita World Bank Predicted Predicted Predicted 
Notes: Standardized betas are reported in column 3. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 
the 1% level is denoted by ***; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and * significance at the 
10% level. We include regional dummies for developing countries to control for within-region 
differences in gender inequality and intelligence.  
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Finally, we replaced SIGI index with Gender Inequality Index (GII) from Human 
Development Report5 to examine whether a negative association of intelligence with gender 
inequality is affected by the choice of the dependent variable (not reported here). The estimates 
indicate that this is not the case. Intelligence retains its statistical significance and negative 
association with gender inequality in developing nations.  
Indirect relationship of intelligence 
As previously conjectured, it is plausible that intelligence may have an indirect connection to 
gender equality through democratic institutions, or economic development. In this context, the 
reduction in magnitude of the coefficient for intelligence in Table 2 may be a signal for the presence 
of an indirect relationship in the intelligence-gender equality nexus. To explore these possibilities, a 
path analysis was performed. Figure 1 shows that the anticipated positive indirect link of IQ runs 
through the democratic institutions (significant at the 1% level). In line with Forsythe et al. (2000), 
we fail to detect the impact of economic development on gender equality. In addition, Baliamoune-
Lutz (2007) argues that economic development in some regions of the world contributed to greater 
gender inequality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1. Standardized path estimates between intelligence, democracy index, HIGHINCOME and SIGI 
(gender inequality). Significance at the 1% level is denoted by ***; ** denotes significance at the 
5% level; and * significance at the 10% level. Path estimates above p>0.05 are indicated by dotted 
lines.  
                                                          
5 See http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii 
IQ 
DEMOCRACY 
HIGHINCOME 
SIGI 
0.576*** 
-0.486*** 0.409*** 
0.010 0.598*** 
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4. Conclusion 
 
This study has investigated the possible association of intelligence on gender inequality using 
data on SIGI and IQ scores for the period 2010–2013. The results show that there is a robustly 
negative link between intelligence and gender inequality. In particular, the estimates for intelligence 
show that for a change in mean country IQ from 79 (Nicaragua) to 88.6 (Turkey) the rescaled SIGI 
falls by approximately 3.9 points. The negative association of intelligence with gender inequality 
preserves its sign and significance even after we introduce a wide range of control variables as 
suggested by the literature. 
Consequently, the findings of this study further shed light on the major question discussed 
within development literature – why are some countries associated with greater gender inequality? 
In particular, we document that intelligence has an indirect association with gender equity 
through civic behavior. From a macroeconomic perspective, it may be feasible to increase the quality 
of political institutions through investing in cognitive skills and education. Indeed, recent 
publications claim that nations with higher IQ have better rule of law (Kanyama, 2014) and lower 
corruption (Potrafke, 2012). From a political viewpoint the results of this study may be elucidated in 
line with Glaeser et al. (2007) who show that human capital increases the benefits of civic 
participation.  
The results of 2SLS regression may also bring about some useful implications. If historical 
prevalence of infectious diseases has an adverse connection to intelligence, then disease eradication 
policy may foster gender equality in a society.  
On the other hand, our research has a number of limitations associated mainly with the 
quality of cross-national IQ data. One of the possible shortcomings of our study is the fact that 
repeated data on IQ scores are not available for developing nations. Due to the cross-sectional nature 
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of the data, the implementation of more sophisticated approaches such as panel data regressions or 
estimations using generalized method of moments (GMM) is not feasible. Further, the intelligence 
scores for some countries are predicted based on IQ tests for neighboring countries with similar 
culture. However, in their seminal work Lynn & Vanhanen (2012a) show that these predictions are 
robust. On the other hand, the estimates of quantile regression provided an opportunity, through the 
cross-sectional nature of the data, to explore the heterogeneous impact of intelligence on gender 
inequality. The results remain valid and significant. Consequently, future research should further 
explore the link between IQ and the gender gap on the individual level using perceptions of gender 
roles on society drawn from cross-national surveys such as the World Values Survey or Gallup 
World Poll.  
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Table 1A.  
Correlation matrix 
 
SIGI IQ 
UV 
damage 
Pathogen 
index Muslim 
Left-
wing Democracy 
Legal 
(f) 
Legal 
(s) HIGHINCOME 
Trade 
(log) 
SIGI 1 
IQ -0.57 1 
UV damage 0.43 -0.70 1 
Pathogen index 0.55 -0.67 0.78 1 
Muslim 0.57 -0.21 0.04 0.16 1 
Left-wing -0.22 0.04 0.19 0.07 -0.22 1 
Democracy -0.49 0.28 -0.29 -0.44 -0.31 0.14 1 
Legal (f) 0.05 -0.14 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.02 -0.06 1 
Legal (s) -0.30 0.56 -0.68 -0.52 -0.16 -0.09 -0.01 -0.55 1 
HIGHINCOME -0.40 0.49 -0.52 -0.55 -0.24 -0.07 0.51 -0.05 0.17 1 
Trade (log) -0.19 0.07 -0.23 -0.27 -0.06 0.01 0.20 -0.08 0.06 0.17 1 
 
 
